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BUY ME SOME PEANUTS AND OWNERSHIP: MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL AND THE NEED FOR
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the World Series was canceled for the first time in ninety
years.1 Although the World Series did not succumb to the Great Depres-
sion, two World Wars, or the San Fransico earthquake, it could not en-
dure mutual mistrust and greed. This note discusses the possibility of
combining powerful unions and employee ownership to combat avarice
and mistrust in Major League Baseball. Section two summarizes the
events leading up to the cancellation of the 1994 World Series and the
current conflict between the Major League Baseball Players ("Players")
and the Major League Baseball Owners ("Owners"). Section three dis-
cusses the different possibilities of employee ownership and collective
activity. Section four addresses the costs and benefits of employee own-
ership. The final section hypothesizes and evaluates a new system for
Major League Baseball that combines strong union representation with
partial employee ownership.
11. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CANCELLATION OF THE
WORLD SERIES AND CURRENT SOURCES OF
CONFLICT BETWEEN PLAYERS AND
OWNERS
A. THE BASEBALL STRIKE
In August 1994, three months before the end of the 1994 regular
season, the Major League Baseball Players Association2 ("MLBPA")
voted to strike.3 When the Players actually went on strike on August 12,
1994,4 they did not astound the Owners, sports writers, or American pub-
1 The only other cancellation of a World Series occurred in 1904 when the New York
Giants refused to play the Boston Pilgrims. The series was -canceled because John McGraw,
the manager of the National League, was still infuriated with Al Johnson, the president of the
American League. Johnson had suspended McGraw in 1902, when McGraw was the manager
of Baltimore in the American League, for excessive fighting with opponents and umpires.
Gerry Fraley, World Series Streak Ends After 90 Years, DALLAs MORNINrG NEws, Sept. 25,
1994, at 19B.
2 The Major League Baseball Players Association is the collective bargaining unit for
the forty-person rosters of each of the Major League Clubs.
3 Richard Justice, With Baseball's Last Out, a Strike, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 12, 1994, at
Al.
4 Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, 880 F. Supp. 246,
251 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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lic at least in part because this was the Players' eighth strike in twenty-
three years.5 The 1994 baseball season began without a collective bar-
gaining agreement or any formal contract between the Players and Own-
ers.6 Accordingly, baseball enthusiasts knew there was a possibility of a
strike. Refusing to play baseball, unfortunately, had become the Players'
only effective weapon to coerce the Owners into signing a collective bar-
gaining agreement which did not include a salary cap.7 The potential and
subsequent actual loss to the Players and Owners did not appear to affect
the bargaining, and both sides refused to compromise. 8
On September 14, 1994, the Owners canceled the rest of the 1994
season and the negotiations continued to stagnate.9 Neither the Owners
nor the Players appeared willing to negotiate on the most controversial
point: the Owners wanted to impose a salary cap or an equivalent salary-
restraint mechanism.' 0 The Owners emphatically stated that they would
not open spring training for the 1995 season without a salary cap and the
Players, equally emphatic, declared that they would not report to spring
training if there was a salary cap in place."
B. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT
On December 23, 1994, the Owners, pursuant to federal labor law,12
declared an impasse in negotiations' 3 and attempted unilaterally to im-
pose the terms of their most recent proposal to the MLPA. 14 On March
15, 1995, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") issued a com-
plaint and notice of hearing alleging, inter alia, that the Owners had vio-
lated § 8(a)(1) and § 5 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")' 5
by unilaterally eliminating, before an impasse had been reached, salary
5 Justice, supra note 3, at A22.
6 Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 251.
7 Justice, supra note 3, at Al; Richard Justice, Baseball Closer to a Strike, WASH. POST,
June 9, 1994, at Dl, D7 [hereinafter Closer to a Strike].
8 Gordon Edes, We've Nothing to Fear But Baseball Itself, SuN-SEN-nNEL FT. LAUDER-
DALE FLA., Sept. 11, 1994, at 1C. Sports writers estimate that the owners lost between $700
million and $1 billion and the Players lost approximately $350 million. Larry Whiteside, Q &
A, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1995, at 78.
9 Mark Maske, Baseball Season Wiped Out, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al [herein-
after Wiped Out].
10 Mark Maske, Baseball's Labor Talks Collapse, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al
[hereinafter Talks Collapse].
11 Id. at Al.
12 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (holding that unilateral action may not be taken
before an impasse is reached).
13 Attempts to negotiate, however, continued until January 1995. Silverman, 880 F.
Supp. at 252.
14 Talks Collapse, supra note 10, at Al.
15 Section 8 provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) [t]o
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7 ["Rights of Employees"]; ... (5) [t]o refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of
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arbitration for certain reserve players, competitive bargaining for certain
free agents, and the anti-collusion provision of their collective bargaining
agreement. 16 The Owners withdrew their demand for a mandatory salary
cap after the NLRB threatened to charge them with a violation of unfair
labor practice for declaring an impasse before one existed.17
In March 1995, the Players achieved a temporary victory. A Fed-
eral District Court in the Southern District of New York issued a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting the Owners from altering the 1994 work
rules.18 The 233-day strike ended almost immediately. 19 When the
Southern District court issued the preliminary injunction, the Players of-
fered to return to work under the term of the old agreement and the Own-
ers immediately accepted the offer.20 After a shortened spring training,
the Players began an abbreviated 1995 season on April 25, 1995.21
C. THE PRESENT SITUATION
The situation, however, is far from being solved. The Owners and
Players have not reached a collective bargaining agreement, and many
sports writers believe that without an agreement, the "situation is ripe"
for another strike.22 Arguably, the Owners are now in a stronger position
to declare an impasse and unilaterally impose a salary cap.23 It appears
his employees." National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1995)) [hereinafter NLRA].
16 Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 250.
17 Owners Remove Cap; Bargaining to Start Again, Dar. FRm PREss, Feb. 4, 1995, at
IB. Under section 8(5), "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... [to] refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
Section 9(a)." NLRA § 8(5). Section 9(a) includes "wages." NLRA § 9(a).
18 Silverman, 880 F. Supp. at 261. U.S. District Judge Sonia Sotomayor ordered the
Owners to restore free-agent bidding, salary arbitration and the anti-collusion provisions of
baseball's expired collective bargaining agreement. The court held that the injunction would
remain effective until: (1) the Players and Owners entered into a new collective bargaining
agreement that replaced the expired agreement; or (2) there was a final disposition of the
matters pending before the National Labor Relations Board; or (3) a "finding of this court
upon petition of players or owners for a dissolution of the injunction demonstrating that an
impasse in good faith bargaining occurred despite a reasonable passage of time negotiating in
good faith the full mandatory terms of the expired basic agreement." Id.
19 On February 3, 1995, the Owners informed the NLRB that they had rescinded their
earlier unilateral changes to the expired collective agreement and they would continue to nego-
tiate with the MLBPA. Id. at 252.
20 On March 29, 1995, the Players offered to return to work under the full terms of the
expired collective bargaining agreement. Id.
21 William Gildea, Baseball's Rich-Poor Gap Widens; Large-Market Teams Get Wealth
of Talent, WASH. Pos, Apr. 15, 1995, at Cl.
22 Charles D. Marvine, Comment, Baseball's Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This
Baseball Cap Doesn't Fit, 43 KANs. L. REa. 625, 626 (1995).
23 1l The NLRA requires the Owners to negotiate with MLBPA over "wages," see
supra note 17. The Owners can now claim they have made a good effort "to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of [their] employees." Id.
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that the Owners are poised to replace the mandatory salary cap once they
are confident that the negotiations have reached an impasse. 24
Under the current system, baseball is headed for another disaster. In
addition to the possibility that the Owners might declare an impasse, fan
attendance and television audiences have dwindled since the last strike.
One would expect that baseball generates enough money to satisfy both
the Players and Owners. Unfortunately, the adversarial relationship be-
tween the Owners and Players has fermented over the past two decades
and has made the current system unworkable. This note will propose a
solution to the current situation. By affording Players partial ownership
in their respective teams, the Owners and Players can begin to ameliorate
their adversarial relationship and both will prosper.
III. DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
AND COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY
Before delving into the possibility of player ownership in Major
League Baseball, it is necessary to examine different possibilities of em-
ployee ownership and the costs and benefits of such possibilities. When
discussing ownership, defining "ownership" is important. Ownership is
typically construed as the possession of two rights: the right to control
and direct the company and the right to appropriate the company's
residual earnings.25 Control may be exercised either directly or indi-
rectly. 26 Direct control is characteristic of a direct democracy, where
every owner has a vote in every decision. General partnerships are a
good example of direct control because, subject to agreement otherwise
among the partners, every partner has an equal stake in the corporation's
future, and thus has a personal stake in selecting management and run-
ning the firm. Indirect control is more prevalent in larger enterprises, in
which the owners vote to elect a board of directors. The board then over-
sees daily decisions of management.
Ownership can also be construed as the possession of only one or
two twigs of an entire bundle of potential ownership rights. For exam-
ple, in a limited partnership an owner may not have the power to control
and direct the company but may retain the right to appropriate the com-
If baseball's general antitrust exemption is eliminated, however, a unilaterally imposed
salary cap could be subject to antitrust scrutiny. Marvine believes that "[s]uch an antitrust
inquiry would find a salary cap to be in violation of federal antitrust law. Only as part of a
collective bargaining agreement with the MLBPA would such a salary cap withstand antitrust
scrutiny." Marvine, supra note 22, at 627.
24 Mark Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game: Now Both Sides Cool Off, WASH. POST, Feb.
12, 1995, at D1, D7 [hereinafter Waiting Game].
25 Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1757 (1990).
26 Id.
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pany's residual assets. As the subsequent discussion will show, in many
employee - "owned" companies, the employee receives residual earnings
without the right to participate in daily decisions - and sometimes with-
out the right to participate in any decisions.27
There are two distinct types of employee-owned firms: "employee-
owned" and "beneficially worker owned."28 In the former type, employ-
ees, through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP"), customarily
have a claim on most or all of the company's net earnings but have no
control over the direction of the company. 29 In such a company, the
investors control the direction of the company and receive a portion of
the company's residual earnings. In the latter type, the fiduciaries, i.e.,
the board of directors, control the firm but do not receive residual earn-
ings.30 Under both of these models, it is important to note that the em-
ployees customarily do not exercise significant managerial control over
the company.
A. THE CREATION OF ESOPs
1. The Enactment of ESOPs
The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA") of
1974 authorized and established the requirements for ESOPs.31 Almost
immediately after promulgating ERISA, the federal government began to
promote and encourage companies to create ESOPs. 32 This policy has
continued for the past two decades. In 1991, for example, there were
twenty times more companies that had at least twenty percent employee
ownership compared with ten years earlier.3 3 Economists predict that by
the year 2000 there will be more employees in companies that are at least
fifteen percent employee-owned than there will be in the entire trade
union movement.34
When Congress authorized ESOPs in 1974, it immediately gave ES-
OPs certain tax advantages.3 5 Over the past two decades, the number of
27 See generally infra part lIH.A.2.
28 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1757.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 PUB. L. No. 93-406, tit. I. § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832 (1974) codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1974).
32 L. KE.so & M. ADLER, THE CAPrrAUST MANIESmTo 22 (1988).
33 JOSEPH R. BLASI & DOUGLAS L. KRusE, THm NEw OWNERS: TmE MASS EMERGENCE
OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN Bus-
Niss 7, 257 (1991) [hereinafter BLASI & KRUSE].
34 Id. at 12.
35 Doernberg & Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 I-ARv. J. ON LEGis 103,
107-108 (1986). The 1974 act provided ESOPs with exemptions from certain requirements
unapplicable to other benefit plans. Unlike standardized pension and profit-sharing plans; an
ESOP afforded employees the opportunity to borrow money and the act stipulated that ESOP
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advantages has increased 36 and the popularity of ESOPs has risen.37
Theoretically, under ERISA, ESOPs are designed to help employees by
creating a deferred compensation plan whereby an employer deposits
stock in a trust fund for the benefit of its employees. 38 This fund often
serves as a reserve for employee pensions.
2. Providing Participation Only Through
Earnings and Not Through Control
A large number of the academics in the field assert that the intent
behind the creation of ESOPs was not to give employees control but to
enable the owners of capital to control and pacify their employees.39
How can an owner donate stock to her employees without parting with
any control?
An owner can establish an ESOP through a written agreement.40
This agreement is usually negotiated between company officials and fi-
nancial representatives and employee representatives (either union or
non-union).41 The agreement establishes a structure and provides author-
ization for an employee stock ownership trust ("ESOT").42 The ESOT is
a separate document from the actual ESOP, and the ESOT's function is
to hold all the assets of the ESOP.43
contributions were tax deductible. In 1975 Congress enacted the Tax Reduction Act Stock
Ownership Plan (TRASOP). Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301, 89 Stat. 26, 36 (1975). Under
TRASOP companies could receive an additional one percent credit over and above the ten
percent investment tax credit if an amount equal to at least one percent of the qualifying
investment was contributed to an ESOP which met the requires of the Act, including immedi-
ate vesting and allocation according to salary. Id.
36 The 1986 Tax Reform Act extended the preexisting tax subsidies to ESOPS (the most
important of which was the exclusion from taxable income of 50% of the interest income from
loans to ESOPS. I.R.C. § 133 (1986)).
ESOPs have also been encouraged on the state level. For example, in 1982 the California
legislature declared that the official state policy was to encourage employee ownership. Em-
ployee Ownership Act, 1983 CAL. LEGIS. SERv. 5347 (West). Two years later, the New York
legislature directed its Department of Commerce to assist employee-owned enterprises in vari-
ous ways, include the issuance of bonds to help finance employee buy-outs at rates below
prime. 1983 N.Y. Laws 1476 (McKinney).
37 ESOPs have also been used to help block hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Shamrock Hold-
ings, Inc., v. Polaroid, Fed. §. L. Rep. (CCH) 94, 176 (Del. Ch. Jan 6, 1989, as amended Mar.
20, 1989) (permitting creation of ESOP as takeover defense under particular circumstances).
38 In practice, however, ESOPs are generally used by owners to secure tax advantages
and pacify employees. See infra part III.A.2.
39 See generally Julie Lynn Kaufman, Democratic ESOPs: Can Workers Control Their
Futures?, 5 Lab. Law. 825 (1989).
40 LoGUE, ET AL., Buy ouT-EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PLANT
SHuTDowNs: THE OHIO EXPERIENCE 15 (1986).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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The typical ESOP is roughly equivalent to a stock savings plan
where shares are held in trust for the employees.44 ESOPs are distin-
guishable in that the company's owners generally appoint a trustee, who
is entitled to vote the shares of stock in the trust.45 This presents an
obvious conflict because the trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the employ-
ees but her job security depends on pleasing the owners.
Theoretically, the appointed trustee(s) has exclusive authority and
discretion to administer the ESOT for the "exclusive benefit of plan par-
ticipants. '46 Under ERISA, a fiduciary can appoint the trustee or the
trustee can be named in either the document establishing the ESOP or the
ESOT.47 In practice, the owners appoint the majority of fiduciaries and
trustees because the owners believe they can coopt the trustee; Le., the
trustee will support ownership decisions - possibly to the detriment of
employees. 48
The Internal Revenue Code also crystallizes the dichotomy between
owing a fiduciary duty to the employees and benefiting ownership. The
Internal Revenue Code § 401(a) defines an ESOP as an employee benefit
or specialized stock bonus plan; notwithstanding such a definition, the
regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service view ESOPs as
a tax benefit to the owners, not as a benefit for the employees.49
Many academics argue that owners use ESOPs as a pacifying tech-
nique in the struggle between owners and employees: ESOPs give em-
ployees just enough to keep them happy, quiet, and more productive.50
The owners can prevent their employees from gaining too much control
through an ESOP by making sure that a substantial fraction of the stock
held by the ESOP is non-voting stock.5' Henry Hansmann, in his article
on employee ownership, describes the traditional view toward employee
participation in control of the company:
44 J. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OwNERsmP: REVOLUTION OR RipoFF? 122-57 (1988).
45 Id.
46 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1974).
47 Id.
48 Kaufman, supra note 39, at 829.
49 I.R.C. § 401 (1995) lists the requirements for a qualifying plan: "A trust created or
organized in the United States and forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing
plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees .... Id. ESOPs are beneficial
to owners because they can finance capital investments more easily with the use of an ESOP.
The owner receives loan proceeds from the employee stock owned trust (ESOT) in return for
stock to the ESOT. Repayment of the loan by the owner is tax-deductible and is made with
future profits.
5o BIAsi, supra note 44, at 123-37.
51 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFcE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OwNERsmaP PLANS: BE-EFrrs AND
CosTs OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OwrMsmP 18, 39-40 (1986). The
median ESOP holds 10% of the total stock of the sponsoring company; however, it holds only
5% of the voting rights. Id.
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The fact that workers typically do not participate in gov-
ernance of these firms suggests strongly that those re-
sponsible for structuring them believe that any reduction
in agency costs that might result from making manage-
ment directly accountable to the firm's workers, even
though the workers are already the firm's beneficial
owners, would be outweighed by the cost - perhaps in
the form of inefficient decisions or high process costs -
that would be engendered by the political process re-
quired for such accountability.5 2
This view toward employee lack of control has been well docu-
mented. Hansmann noticed that even in situations where the ESOPs own
as much as seventy-five percent of the stock, the employees do not nec-
essarily have any control of the company.5 3 Some researchers have
found that even in a one-hundred percent employee-owned company,
workers can be totally insulated from the process of electing board mem-
bers and from making decisions regarding the company's future.54
Accordingly, until recently, genuine advocates of employee govern-
ance did not support ESOPs.55 The traditional view has been that ESOPs
generally do not provide for substantial worker participation, do not
eliminate conflict of interests between labor and management, and lack
the benefits that normally accompany employee ownership.5 6 The more
recent and optimistic view is that there are some reasons to think that
most of the ESOPs of the 1980s will evolve during the 1990s into a "new
and exciting form of partial employee control. '57 The recent but moder-
ate view supports the idea that many firms with ESOPs will evolve
somewhere between the traditional and optimistic views: with employ-
ees exercising a role analogous to that of shareholders with modest
stakes in a company but not the type of control generally associated with
nineteenth-century worker cooperatives. 5 8
In the twentieth-century billion dollar business world, ESOPs are
necessary but not sufficient. Reverting to nineteenth century coopera-
52 HANSMANN, supra note 25 at 1799.
53 Id.
54 See C. Rosen, et al, Employee Ownership in America: The Equity Solution 14 (1986).
55 See Jonathan Prude, ESOP's Fable: How Workers Bought a Steel Mill in Weirton,
West Virginia, and What Good it Did Them, 14 SocAusT REv. 27, 38 (1984); Henry M.
Levin, ESOP's AND THE FINANCING OF WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 245 (Robert
Jackal & Henry M. Levin eds., 1984).
56 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1810 (1990). See generally Carol A. Glick, Labor Man-
agement Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or Frustrate National Labor Policy, 7 HoF-
sTRA LJ. 219 (1989).
57 Alan Hyde, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67
Cm-KErNr. L. REv. 159, 161 (1991).
58 Id.
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tives would be virtually impossible for a multimillion dollar company. If
employees want some control of a company, they need an organized and
formal structure to obtain control. It is equally clear, however, that ES-
OPs have not generally afforded employees the opportunity to take a
greater role in corporate governance. This note will show that when ES-
OPs are combined with powerful unions and other forms of strong em-
ployee activity, they can afford employees an opportunity to participate
in corporate governance to the benefit of both employees and owners.
B. UNIONIZATION
How can ESOPs develop in such a way as to afford employees a
greater role in cooperate governance? Stronger unions are the solution.
Most employees, as individuals, do not have the power or economic
sophistication to participate actively in ESOP agreements without the
assistance of powerful unions.
1. Unions' Traditional Role
Traditionally, "[unions'] political process is used not to select the
firm's management but to select representatives to bargain with a man-
agement chosen by the firm's shareholders. '59 The academic literature
suggests that unions are declining in importance. 60 In 1935, unions were
expected to become strong adversarial units to enhance employee rights
through collective bargaining.6' Sixty years later, highly skilled employ-
ees do not generally belong to unions: in the 1990s unions are generally
composed of the lesser skilled employees. 62
For the last sixty years, union strength has vacillated. At times, the
employees that unions represented did not receive significant support
from their respective unions. Traditionally, unions bargained with man-
agement over a narrow range of issues, including: minimum wages,
maximum hours, and job classifications. 63 If a union was not required to
59 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1804.
60 See generally Hansmann, supra note 25; Hyde, supra note 57; BLAsi & KRusE, supra
note 33.
61 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1995)).
62 Moreover, where unionized jobs were diverse, employees tended to be fractioned into
separate bargaining units. Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1804.
63 Under §9(a) unions are only required to bargain over "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." NLRA, supra note 15, § 9(a). This provision does not pre-
vent negotiations between the union and the employer concerning other issues, however, such
issues are permissive rather than mandatory. The distinction between mandatory and permis-
sive is imperative when determining if the union or owners violated § 8(a)(5); both parties owe
a higher duty if the unilaterally terminate a mandatory act. For a discussion of the difference
between mandatory and permissive issues see Ohio Power Company and Local Union No.
478 (Utility Workers), 317 N.L.R.B. 135 (April 28, 1995).
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negotiate over a certain issue, it tended not to concem itself with that
issue.64 Unions tended intentionally to confine their scope of
bargaining.65
2. Unions' Potential Role in Employee Ownership
Section 9(a) of the NLRA does not specifically confine the union's
role. 66 The statute mandates union involvement in certain issues and
specifically authorizes union involvement in negotiating permissive
issues.
a. Traditional Enemies
In the 1980s, unions did not approve of ESOPs for two reasons.
First, unions felt ESOPs interfered with previous union victories. Sec-
ond, practical and ideological differences existed between union goals
and employee ownership goals.
Unions feared that ESOPs would meddle with industry-wide wage
rates and would jeopardize employee pension plans. In the 1980s, un-
ions were relatively successful in achieving industry-wide wage rates,
i.e., union members would receive the same pay for the same work, re-
gardless of where they worked.67 The owners, however, demanded con-
cessions in return for an ESOP. In order to participate in an ESOP
employees had to make wage and benefit concessions. 68 Accordingly,
there could be a vast salary discrepancy between employees doing the
same job at different companies. 69 Thus employee ownership violated
what some perceived as a basic tenet of unionism.
Unions also feared that ESOPs could jeopardize employee pension
plans. ESOPs generally replace rather than supplement pension plans. 70
The unions, understandably, believed that ESOPs were not adequate sub-
stitutes for pension plans.71 A paradigm strength of a pension plan is
diversification. With an ESOP, the funds are invested in only one com-
pany; accordingly, the funds are not diversified and are subject to a
greater risk. The employee, by investing all of her stock in the same
64 M. Aogi, THE COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FiRM 151-71 (1984).
65 The recent literature suggests, however, that unions are beginning to enlarge the scope
of bargaining. Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerg-
ing Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 86-96 (1988).
66 Under § 9(a) the union is afforded the power to negotiate over "rates of pay, wages,
and hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. NLRA, supra note 15, § 9(a).
67 Elana R. Hollo, Note, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans and
Their Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions and Future American Policy, 23
RUTGERS L.J. 561, 590 (1992).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 107-09.
71 Id.
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place she works, is putting all of her eggs in one basket. If the company
fails, the employee will not only lose her job, but will also be left with
worthless stock with limited future potential income.72
The discontent with ESOPs also stemmed from a more ideological
fear. Unions viewed employees and owners as irreconcilable enemies.
According to many union leaders, the introduction of ESOPs was simply
another device to coopt workers' sympathies and weaken union strength.
Unions believed that owners would placate the leaders of the new em-
ployee-owners and "persuade" them to side with the owners on contro-
versial issues.
b. Employee Ownership and its Ability to Revitalize the Labor
Movement
Employee ownership could revitalize the labor movement by pro-
viding a structured framework for increased employee participation and
control. Unions could protect employees' interests during the ESOP ne-
gotiations with the owners. If employees want to have input in establish-
ing the control mechanisms of the ESOP, (i.e., the allocation of voting
versus nonvoting stock, mandatory information exchange, the right to
elect board members, and other employee benefits), the time to protect
this employee input is before the ESOP instrument is completed and im-
plemented. 73 Most employees lack the necessary information, education,
experience, and collective force to assert effective influence upon the
ESOP agreement. The unions could provide these missing elements.
Moreover, employees who are ESOP participants have concerns as
shareholders in addition to their concerns as employees. If employees
want to maximize their power as shareholders, they need to act together
in an organized fashion. Coordinated action requires informed investors
who understand the workings of their corporation in particular and the
stock market in general. Unions could fulfill these needs and make em-
ployees equal bargaining partners with the owners.
3. Collective Bargaining and the Role of Unions
In his article, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collec-
tive Bargaining, Robert Moberly asserts that all programs for employee
participation depend on successful sharing of information:
The ability of workers to participate in company deci-
sions will always be limited so long as they are unable to
72 Tom Petruno, Market Beat: Standard Brands' Story May Get Even Gloomier, L.A.
Tircms, April 24, 1991, at Dl, col.5; Jesus Sanchez, Workers Angry Over Big Stock Losses,
L.A. Trmns, Feb. 12, 1991, at D1, col. 2.
73 Kaufman, supra note 39, at 827.
19961
412 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5:401
obtain financial information about the company, includ-
ing profits, costs, production figures, and other informa-
tion concerning an employer's ability to pay or to
operate effectively. 74
Moberly asserts that unions will be unwilling to agree to wage conces-
sions in return for employee ownership unless the company is completely
honest and open with respect to its financial condition.75 The company's
duty to share information, however, is very limited under the NLRA.
The NLRA does not require an owner to divulge financial information,
unless the owner claims an inability to pay. 7 6 Consequently, owners
avoid claiming inability to pay unless divulging such financial informa-
tion is to their advantage. 77
As discussed earlier,78 the NLRA and the Supreme Court have
drawn a distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining.79
There are numerous permissive items that are extremely important to em-
ployees, such as if their shares of stock will be voting or non-voting. The
unions are not required to consider these topics in their collective bar-
gaining agreements with the owners, but the unions do have the statutory
power to consider these and other pertinent issues.
C. EMPLOYEES ON A COMPANY's BOARD OF DmEC-rORs
Unions not only have the power to influence the appropriate per-
centage of shares that employees are able to vote, but unions also have
the power to negotiate for employee membership on boards of directors.
1. The Chrysler Experiment
Chrysler Corporation was the first major American company to ex-
periment with union representation on a board of directors. In 1979,
Chrysler was in great financial distress. In a bold move to climb out of
this financial crisis, Chrysler's management asked the President of the
United Auto Workers ("UAW"), Douglas Fraser, to serve on its Board of
Directors. 80 In 1985, when his term expired, Fraser said that his eight
years of service were constructive, informative, and useful to both the
74 Robert B. Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargain-
ing, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 765, 781 (1985).
75 Id.
76 NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Empire Terminal Ware-
house Co., 151 NLRB, 1359 (1965), aff'd sub nom, Dallas Gen. Drivers Local 745 v. NLRB,
355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Caster Mold and Machine Co., 148 NLRB 1614 (1964).
77 Moberly, supra note 74, at 781.
78 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
79 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
80 Moberly, supra note 74, at 766.
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UAW and the Chrysler Corporation.8' Accordingly, Chrysler's local
union leadership voted to continue the practice of having a union leader
on the Chrysler Board of Directors.82 Taking their lead from Chrysler
Corporation, other large companies began to allow employee participa-
tion on their boards of directors.8 3 Generally, however, only those com-
panies in severe financial distress resulting from foreign competition or
forced deregulation invited such employee participation.84
In his article, Robert Moberly argues that successful agreements for
employee membership on a board of directors should include five ele-
ments.85 First, the union should have an active role in choosing the indi-
vidual to sit on the board of directors.8 6 Second, the chosen director
should represent the interests of both union and non-union employees.8 7
Third, the union representatives should participate in certain business de-
cisions.8 8 Fourth, the owners should allow the representatives to com-
ment and make suggestions with respect to business plans, major capital
expenditures, construction of new facilities or remodeling of existing fa-
cilities, and the development of new designs and plans.89 Fifth, the
union representatives should have unconstrained access to the company's
financial information. Moberly concludes that if owners gave employees
more control in corporate governance and full information with unlim-
ited union access to financial data, the company's productivity would
improve, employees would be happier, and there would be greater job
security for the employees.90
81 Id
82 The Chrysler Board of Directors was not as enthusiastic. When Mr. Fraser declined to
stand for reelection to the Chrysler Board, there was a dispute over the nature of his seat. Mr.
Fraser emphatically stated that his seat was granted to the UAW in 1979 in return for labor-
cost concessions, and that his role on the board has been to serve as a representative of the
Chrysler Workers. According to the Chrysler Corp., however, Mr. Fraser was granted a seat
on the board in recognition of his personal talents and stature in the automobile industry.
Melinda Grenier Guiles, Fraser Says He Won't Stand for Reelection to Chrysler's Board,
WALL ST. L, 1984 WL-WSJ 232964, Mar. 2, 1984; Melinda Grenier Guiles, Chrysler is Likely
To Name UAW's Bieber to Board; Union Seen Controlling Seat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1984,
1984 WL-WSJ 214024 at *1.
83 Moberly, supra note 74, at 766.
84 For example, the airline, trucking and steel industries all considered the use of an
ESOP and employee participation on board of directors. Id.
85 Moberly, supra note 74, at 766.
86 IL
87 Id
88 Id
89 Id
90 Id
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2. ESOPs and Corporate Governance
Traditionally, employees voted with management in takeover battles
because their primary concern was protecting their jobs.91 With the
plethora of mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s, employees quickly
learned that if a corporate raider buys a highly leveraged company, the
raider will frequently scale back operations to decrease the company's
debt.92 Consequently, the raider will fire numerous employees. For ex-
ample, "[d]uring 1984 and the first half of 1985, takeovers affected an
estimated 550,000 jobs related restructuring decisions. '93 Thus, employ-
ees voted with management to block the takeover. The managers voted
to block the takeover because they feared that the new owners would
replace them with their own management team.
Institutional investors and individuals making tender offers, ie.,
corporate raiders, are challenging this view. Corporate raiders are de-
emphasizing the use of leveraging takeovers and want rights as share-
holders. Institutional investors also want rights as shareholders. Accord-
ingly, when a raider prevails with a tender offer, the company that
emerges is generally more financially sound than a company emerging
from a leveraged buyout.94 Thus, there is less need to scale back opera-
tions and employees will not necessarily lose their jobs.95
Moreover, the growth of institutional investors has increased the
power of ESOP participants. 96 In 1991, institutional investors controlled
between forty-five and fifty percent of the total stock market and forty-
eight percent of the top one thousand companies. 97 Additionally, in
1991, thirty percent of the top one thousand companies were sixty per-
cent owned by institutional investors.98 The rise of the institutional in-
vestors and the decrease in the number of hostile takeovers have set the
stage for employees to assert greater influence in corporate decision
making. 99 The issues to be decided range from divestment in South Af-
rica to appointment of union leaders on company boards of directors. 100
As the discussion below will show, employee influence on corporate de-
91 ESOP's Might Be a Help to Buyouts, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENT AGE, April 15, 1991,
at 8 (hereinafter INvESTmNT AGE).
92 Id.
93 Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers - Reflec-
tions on the Tin Parachute, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 3, 5 (1989).
94 INVESTMENT AGE, supra note 91 at 8.
95 Id.
96 BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 33, at 2.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Sarah Bartlett, Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Management of Companies, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1990, at Al.
100 Id. at D5.
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cision making can lead to greater employee satisfaction and prosperity
not only for the employees, but also for the owners.
3. Prospects for the future
The recent literature suggests that there are no theoretical or legal
problems with employee representation on boards of directors. In his
article, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems
and Potentials, Professor Robert Summers articulates a theoretical basis
through which employee representation on boards of directors could be
integrated by statute into the American industrial relations system.'0 '
Moreover, no legal hindrances to employee ownership exist. The NLRB
did not object to Douglas Fraser's appointment to the Chrysler Board of
Directors.' 0 2 The NLRB general counsel stated that there was no unlaw-
ful conflict of interest or owner domination.'0 3
The future is optimistic but uncertain. Professor Hyde writes:
At this point it is unclear just how much power em-
ployee shareholders will assert. Employees have been
tentative in using their new power'because ... they are
not accustomed to being shareholders. As they become
more seasoned and sophisticated in this role, employees
are likely to take advantage of the current corporate cli-
mate and assert themselves to a greater degree. This will
result in a new balance of power in corporate
govefnance. 0 4
IV. POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Part III suggested that combining stronger unions with ESOPs
would benefit employees and owners. To evaluate this concept fully, it
is necessary to appreciate the benefits and costs of employee ownership.
101 See generally Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projec-
tion of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. Comp. Coiu. L. & SEc. REG. 155, 161 (1982).
102 Carol A. Glick, Note, Labor-Management Cooperative Programs: Do They Foster or
Frustrate National Labor Policy?, 7 HoFmsTA LAB. L. 219, 248 (1989).
103 The Federal Trade Commission also sustained employee participation under antitrust
laws. Id. There are potential problems, however, when a director of a union takes a seat on
the board of directors. As a director, she would owe a fiduciary duty to all shareholders. As a
union representative, she would owe a fiduciary duty to her union members. This situation has
not been clearly addressed by the courts, but it appears that some unions are technically cir-
cumventing this potential dilemma by having retired union leaders sit on the board of direc-
tors. Telephone Interview with Lynn Williams, Former General Counsel of Steel Workers
Union (Nov. 13, 1995).
104 Hollo, supra note 67 at 589 (1992).
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A. BENEFITS
Professor Hyde gives an optimistic but qualified view concerning
the future of employees' role in corporate governance.10 5 According to
Hyde, employee ownership is most appealing where, in addition to the
ordinary conflicts of interest between owners and employees, the history
of ownership opportunism has led to a lack of trust between owners and
employees.10 6 Employee ownership in this situation, accompanied by
genuine employee control, offers a potential avenue to reduce conflict of
interest and supervision costs, increased sharing of information, fewer
Prisoner Dilemmas, and more efficient long-term labor contracts for both
the employees and the firm. 07
1. Monitoring and Motivating Employees
In theory, there is a high inverse correlation between the ability to
monitor employees and the hazard of employees shirking their responsi-
bilities. The more difficult it is to monitor employees, the greater the
opportunity for employees to shirk. Employee ownership would de-
crease shirking problems. If employees owned the company, they would
bear all the costs of their shirking. It is true that each individual em-
ployee would only bear a small fraction of the cost of her shirking and
there would be problems of "free riding" with employee ownership;
however, each employee would have a greater incentive to monitor her
fellow employees and pressure them not to shirk.
In practice, this correlation is not completely linear. Initially, one
would suspect that monitoring someone doing manual labor would be
relatively easier than monitoring someone engaged in a more cerebral
profession.' 0 8 Accordingly, one would suspect that there would be less
need for employee ownership in the industrial sector than in the service
sector. Thus, it would appear logical that there is a high degree of em-
ployee ownership in law firms and a relatively low degree of employee
ownership in construction firms.
The logic is partially flawed, however, because it has become a
common practice in many law firms to compute with relative accuracy
the marginal contribution of a lawyer to the law firm's net earnings. By
comparison, computing the marginal contribution of a supervisor in a
construction firm would be extremely difficult.' 0 9
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
109 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1763.
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Accordingly, monitoring alone does not suffice as an explanation
for employee ownership. The other obvious explanation is motivation.
Arguably, partners in a law firm work long hours not because other law-
yers are monitoring them but for more basic reasons - self-esteem, pro-
fessional responsibility and a desire to increase the firm's profits. Their
wages, however, are based on a percentage of the firm's profits. Thus
they also encourage other lawyers to work harder.
2. Employee Lock-in
In addition to the extrinsic factors, employees have intrinsic incen-
tives which not only increase their desire to keep their jobs, but which
also make the employees vulnerable to exploitation. By working for a
company for a long time, employees make personal investments in the
community where they are employed. 110 Employers do not adequately
compensate for these investments in the employee's discharge benefit's
package."' When an employee works for a company for a long time, a
spouse may be employed in the same vicinity, her children attend the
local schools, and the family makes certain ties with the community. Ac-
cordingly, the employee's valuation of her present company may exceed
the potential financial compensation from employment elsewhere.
Under the antagonistic model of behavior between employees and own-
ers, when the owner realizes that an employee has made these personal
investments, the owner will have an incentive to act opportunistically by
either reducing her wages or demanding more from her employees.
If the employee perceives this possible exploitation, she will gener-
ally insist on higher starting wages. 112 The employee may also resist
making otherwise efficient company-specific investments, i.e., training
that would help her with her present job.113 The cumulative effect of this
perception will make contracting for employment more costly to owners
and employees.
Employee ownership helps negate the antagonistic model. Why
would anyone be antagonistic with herself? Employee ownership
reduces the incentives for exploitation and reduces the cost of contracting
for employment. As employee-owners, they will appreciate the need for
long term contracts and other avenues to help avoid this opportunism.
11o Id. at 1764.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. The employee may also insist on extensive employment and wage guarantees. Id.
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3. Strategic Behavior in Bargaining
Many employees believe that their employers do not comprehend or
appreciate their preferences. 1 4 Accordingly, these employees are poised
in an adversarial relationship with their managers/owners. Moreover,
employees perceive that the owners want to get the most out of them for
the least amount of compensation. Consequently, employees might em-
phasize certain preferences other than their personal desires if they think
the owners will acquiesce to those preferences. Under the antagonistic
model, it is a zero-sum game. From the employees' point of view, every
perceived victory for them is a defeat for the owners. When employees
and owners play this game to its logical conclusion, employees will not
be motivated by their personal desires. Professor Hansmann suggests
that "[b]y merging labor and management, [the merger] removes their
conflict of interest and assures that they share the same information."'1 15
Accordingly, when they share the information, employees and owners
will cease playing their respective power games and only negotiate the
preferences that truly concern them.
4. Costs of Delegating Decisions to Outside Management
Most investors glean their knowledge about the company solely
from the company prospectus, which is prepared by the owners, and thus
make their decision to invest solely on the basis of outside knowledge.' 1 6
Investors' knowledge is second-hand, and they elect a board of directors
who may or may not be knowledgeable about the company. Employees,
on the other hand, have first hand knowledge. If the employees were
owners they would be able to make decisions that were within their area
of expertise and would be better equipped to select managers and
directors.
5. Enjoyment in Governance
Lastly, employees receive an intangible benefit from employee gov-
ernance. Hansmann suggests that "[i]ndividual workers might enjoy the
process of collective decision-making as a communal activity that is sat-
isfying in itself quite apart from the character of the decision reached." 117
There is no reason to believe that employees are any different from other
individuals who enjoy this process and would not gain psychological sat-
isfaction simply from the sense of being in control. If owners gave their
employees some control in making company decisions, employees might
be willing to sacrifice a certain percentage of their wages. Moreover, it
114 I&
115 Id. at 1766.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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is axiomatic that productivity increases when employees are happier and
are more concerned about their company's future. Consequently, instead
of the zero-sum game,' 18 employee governance will add to the economic
and personal satisfaction of both employees and owners.
B. COSTS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
Employee ownership is not all a bed of roses. Employee ownership
creates certain problems for the company and the employee. 119
1. Raising Capital
A common skepticism about employee ownership is that lenders
would be potentially more risk averse to lending money to employee-
owned companies because, as shareholders, employees are the equity
owners of the firm. Accordingly, employees are first in line to receive
the company's profits. However, if the company goes bankrupt, a bank-
ruptcy court will subrogate their interests to creditors. With employee-
owned companies, it is conceivable that the lenders would fear that be-
cause the employees are also equity owners, employees would attempt to
divert profits into dividends and not worry about paying off liabilities,
until perhaps it was too late.
This skepticsm is without foundation. Regardless of who owns a
company, the owners are always entitled to the residual assets, and lend-
ers are always concerned about owners taking profits rather than paying
liabilities. Lenders can (and do) protect themselves by making certain
demands in a loan agreement. Lenders typically require companies to
specify under what conditions they will pay dividends. Lenders can also
require additional security for their loan.
2. Under-Diversification
If employees supply the required capital themselves in the form of a
pension plan or another form of personal wealth in the company, the
employees in employee-owned companies would be severely under-di-
versified.120 There are two types of capital: human capital (workers) and
investment capital (shares of companies). In an employee-owned com-
pany, both types of capital are in the same place. If the company folds,
the employee-owner will lose her human capital and her investment
capital.
The under-diversification problem becomes exacerbated by the fact
that the employees' pension plans are also located in the same company.
118 See infra Part VI.A.3.
119 See infra Part V.B.2.b to see how these costs, in the context of baseball, are negated.
120 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1772.
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In the last twenty years, diversification has been one of the most profita-
ble investment strategies. By combining their savings, pension plans,
and salaries into the same company the employees are taking a greater
risk. If employees lose their jobs, they will not only lose their wages but
may lose their savings as well.
3. Lack of Managerial Skills
A common concern about employee ownership is that the employ-
ees lack the necessary skills to run the company. Hansmann addresses
this issue by stating: "an individual worker need not herself have the
expertise to make managerial decisions in order for her to exercise her
voice effectively as an owner. She need only be able to vote intelligently
in electing the firm's directors." 121 Moreover, as partial owners the
ESOP agreement could stipulate that the employees could only influence
certain decisions. As part owners, the employees would want what is
best for the company. Arguably, they will act rationally and not try to
influence decisions which should be made by the owners or managers.
V. BASEBALL
A. WAGE SCALE
The concept of a wage scale in professional sports was first intro-
duced by Darryl Hale, in his article entitled Step Up to the Scale: Wages
and Unions in the Sports Industry.122 Hale implicitly supports the idea
of greater union involvement in sports bargaining and expressly advo-
cates the elimination of agents. This note incorporates the concept of a
wage scale as a base and explicitly encourages combining greater union
involvement and ESOPs to the wage scale concept.
1. Sports Bargaining
The MLBPA collectively bargains with Players and Owners about
fringe benefits and basic employment conditions.'23 Section 9(a) of the
NLRA states that "[r]epresetatives designated or selected for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such a unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing..... ."124 Baseball, however, is different from most other unionized
industries because, in baseball, players can negotiate their individual sal-
121 Id. at 1806.
122 Darryl Hale, Step Up to the Scale: Wages and Unions in the Sports Industry, 5 MARQ.
SPORTS LJ. 123, 124 (1994).
123 Id.
124 NLRA, supra note 15, § 9(a) (emphasis added).
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aries directly with the owners. 125 This negotiation occurs through a bi-
furcated system. The MLBPA establishes the minimum contract terms
and allows the players' personal agents to negotiate with the owners over
the contract length and salaries. 126
The majority of Players selected the MLBPA for the purpose of
collective bargaining. Accordingly, the MLBPA has exclusive jurisdic-
tion as the bargaining representative for the Players. The union, how-
ever, has implicitly waived its exclusive jurisdiction by failing to pursue
league-wide scales. 127 As a result, the Players' personal agents have the
power to negotiate contracts with the owners individually. 128 Although
most people would not consider million-dollar-athletes deprived or
abused, this bifurcated system creates inequality among the Players. Bi-
furcating the system and affording agents this extensive power makes
certain Players, despite the collectively bargained contract minimums,
vulnerable to agent abuse.'2 9
2. Agent Argument that Imposition of a Wage Scale Will
Infringe Upon the Player's Freedom to Contract and
Participate in Voluntary Exchanges
The agents assert that imperfections in the system will be cured by
the "market." The market theory is that with perfect information, the
laws of supply and demand will assure a fair system. The agents argue
that the market will correct the exploitation problems because Players
will pick the fair, honest, and talented agents. 130 Accordingly, the Play-
ers will drive the corrupt agents out of the market. The core of the
American Constitution, according to these agents, is freedom and indi-
vidual autonomy. According to lawyers in the field of law and econom-
ics, freedom of contracts facilitates efficient labor markets.13' Moreover,
the agents argue that a wage scale is a foreign element imposed by a
125 Philip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a
Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REv. 341, 385 (1983). Although this note only discusses
professional baseball, there are similar systems in football and other professional sports; the
distinction here is between professional sports and other unionized industries.
126 Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining:
Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 705-06 (1981).
127 Closius, supra note 125 at 385.
128 Id.
129 Michael A. Weiss, The Regulation of Sports Agents: Fact or Fiction, 1 SpoRTS LAW.
J. 329, 330-31 (1994). Weiss argues that there are seven common indiscretions associated
with sports agents: (1) income mismanagement; (2) excessive fees; (3) confficts of interest; (4)
incompetence; (5) overly aggressive client recruitment practices; (6) disruption of existing
contractual relationships; and (7) misappropriation of funds entrusted to the agent by the ath-
lete. Id. at 331.
130 Hale, supra note 122 at 125.
131 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. C. L. REv. 947, 951
(1984).
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remote foreign body that is not likely to have better information concern-
ing the Players' individual preferences. 132 The actual contracting parties,
the Players and Owners, have the best information.
The market is not a panacea. The market does not correct the lack
of financial and entrepreneurial skill of athletes, especially entry level
athletes. On the other hand, a wage scale negotiated by the Players'
union would help equalize the otherwise inherent power differentials.
Many Players lack bargaining power because they did not attend big-
league sports colleges and were not first-round draft choices. 133 In addi-
tion, some Players lack the financial and educational resources to hire
any agent at all and are left with a "take it or leave it contract."'134
3. Wage Scale as Negotiated by the Players' Union - Not a
Foreign Public Body
The Players' Union is the only collective entity that has both the
experience and knowledge necessary to address the concerns facing pro-
fessional athletes. 135 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA states that the unions
have the statutory right to obtain necessary and relevant information
from the Owners to protect the bargaining interests of its members. 136
Section 8(b)(1)(a) of the NLRA states that the unions owe a fiduciary
duty to their members. 137 The Supreme Court has strictly enforced the
duty of fair and adequate representation on unions because the Court
intends unions to be the exclusive bargaining representatives of their
members.138 The authority of the exclusive bargaining representative is
similar to a legislative body: both have the power to restrict the rights of
its representatives but both also have a duty to perform their representa-
tion fairly and without discrimination. 139 Thus, MLBPA as the elected
132 Hale, supra note 122, at 125.
133 Id. at 125-26.
134 Id. at 126.
135 Id.
136 NLRA, supra note 15, § 8(a)(5). Neither players nor their representative agents have
the statutory right to such information. Michael Eggert, Comment, Union Obligations to Dis-
close Information Under the Duty of Representation: A Survey 25 DUQIJESNE L. REv. 959
(1987).
137 NLRA, supra note 15, § 8(b)(1)(a); The NLRA does not cover agents; accordingly,
they do not have a statutory mandate to represent their representatives fairly and without
discrimination.
138 Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In a recent decision, the
NLRB expanded upon the unions obligations. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local
444 (Paramax Sys. Corp.), 311 N.L.R.B. 1031 (May 28, 1993). The board imposed an affirm-
ative duty on unions to provide information to all employees working under union-security
clauses requiring "membership in good standing," regardless of whether an employee has re-
quested the information or whether the union has engaged in unlawful conduct. Il
139 Hale, supra note 122, at 134.
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bargaining agent for the Players has the statutory right to certain infor-
mation and the statutory responsibility of treating all players fairly.
B. BENEFITS OF A LEAGUE-WIDE WAGE SCALE
There are three prominent benefits to an imposed wage scale. First,
the Players would have greater job security, more structured pension
plans, and greater severance and disability benefits. 140 Second, a wage
scale would foster greater equality among the Players. The scale would
funnel some money away from exorbitant contracts for rookies or poten-
tial prospects toward veterans and lesser-known Players.' 41 Without a
scale, individual salary negotiations, which largely depend upon the
skills of the agent, rather than the skills of the player, determine Player
salaries. 142 Third, the contracts would be more stable if a wage scale
were imposed. Greater contract stability would help alleviate the prob-
lem of shifting membership because of professional athletes who have
relatively short career spans. 143
1. Combining Wage Scale with an ESOP
A system that combines a wage scale with employee ownership
would require a strong union. In this system the union would not only
set the basic minimums, but would also give Players more influence in
management decisions by making the Players part owners. The union,
through a collective bargaining agreement, would negotiate with the
Owners a fixed percentage of every Players' contract to be paid in their
team's stock. The union would insist that, as part owners, the Players
must have the capacity to influence certain aspects of management.
2. Formulating a League Wage Scale
The collective bargaining agreement would state that every player is
entitled to the same percentage of the team's net profit. Players render
performance as a team; accordingly, they should distribute economic
benefits as a team.' 4 The collective bargaining agreement would also
state that each player would be entitled to additional stock based on his
performance. 145 Objective criteria should determine the performance bo-
nus at the end of every season. This would increase Players' motivation
and award productivity.
140 Id. at 135.
141 Id at 126.
142 Berry & Gould, supra note 126, at 801-02.
143 Id. at 708-09.
144 Hale, supra note 122, at 130-31.'
145 Id.
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Although an ideal system would be based completely on objective
performance, clearly this is not possible with professional baseball. Cer-
tain factors are difficult to measure. For example, Dwight Gooden drew
many New Yorkers to watch him pitch, even when he was past his
prime. The Owners would have to have some discretionary power to
compensate Players for such non-tangible assets.
3. Players' Role in Decision Making
Players are more knowledgeable than Owners about a variety of is-
sues. For example, the Players have a greater insight into what makes a
good manager. Furthermore, an objectively "good manager" will not
necessarily be a successful manager if he does not have the Players' con-
fidence and respect. Accordingly, it is imperative that the Players have
some role in this decision-making process. The ESOP agreement should
specifically state which decisions the Players should have input and
which decisions should be reserved for Owners.
4. Economic Benefits of an ESOP
As shareholders through an ESOP, Players would be allowed to
help control the selection of management and help establish salaries. 146
As part owners, the Players would better appreciate the need to limit
their salaries to reasonable levels to maintain the value of their shares
that they own in the team. 147 Some sports writers have suggested that
the Players' salaries should be negotiated in the traditional method with
agents, except that the Owners should pay a predetermined percentage of
the Players' salaries in the form of an ESOP.148 That would only solve
part of the problem. The inequities due to different agents would still
exist. 149
The tax benefits of an ESOP would benefit both Players and Own-
ers because the Players would retain their shares tax-free and their shares
would continue to increase so long as both the Players and Owners con-
trolled their costs.15 0 The Owners could take advantage of these tax ben-
efits by paying the Players less money to account for the fact that part of
the Players' salaries were now tax-free. The Players would still receive
more than generous monthly incomes and could accumulate large equity
interests. The Players could convert these interests into cash or another
type of Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") upon retiring or being
146 Irwin B. Renton, Baseball - Answer is ESOP, SEA-E Tmms, Mar. 12, 1995, at D2.
147 Id.
148 James A. Dickson, And Now, a Lyrical Poem to Protest, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 1994,
at 5C.
149 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
ISO Renton, supra note 146, at D2.
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traded to another team.151 The collective bargaining agreement would
have to establish a specific buy-out formula for when the Owners traded
or fired Players or if Players wanted to be transferred to another team.152
If the Owners sold the team, the Players' stock interest would presuma-
bly have appreciated as the franchise appreciated.' 53 This would result
in a capital gain and deferred compensation when the franchise is sold.' 54
C. WHY BASEBALL WOULD SUCCEED WITH COLLECTIVE
GOVERNANCE
Major League Baseball is the paradigmatic case for employee own-
ership. According to Professor Hyde, employee ownership is most ap-
pealing when, in addition to the ordinary conflicts of interests between
owners and employees, there exists a history of opportunism and mutual
mistrust.' 55 In 1975 when George Steinbrenner began paying Players
exorbitant salaries in an effort to buy a championship team,156 the other
owners were forced to respond similarly. This race to buy the best Play-
ers and the accompanying hardships has led to two decades of escalating
conflicts between the Owners and Players, both of whom believe the
other is being opportunistic and unfair.
1. Employee Ownership Can Exist Among Unequals
According to Professor Hansmann, employee ownership is ex-
tremely rare in firms where there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity
in the work force.' 57 Hansmann asserts that successful employee owner-
ship exists primarily where all employees have approximately the same
level of skill. 158 Under this theory, it is unlikely that employee owner-
ship can exist where employees have substantially different levels of
skill. Hansmann deduces this theory by analogizing to law firms.' 59
151 Id.
152 Dickson, supra note 148, at 5C. The Owners' limited discretionary fund mentioned in
reference to compensating players for non-objective assets could also be used by an Owner
who perceived that a player was worth more than his wage scale suggested. This amount
should be limited, however, to avoid the same problems that occurred during the mid 1970s.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Hyde, supra note 57, at 174.
156 With the advent of free agency, Steinbrenner began paying exorbitant prices to build a
championship team. "Steinbrenner contributed to higher baseball salaries from the beginning
of free agency, signing Catfish Hunter to a record contract in 1975, then Reggie Jackson and
others in the years that followed, and paying even higher salaries to less-talented players in
recent years. Marvin Miller, Baseball's Bottom-line Logic, N.Y. TvfMs, Mar. 6, 1992, at A33.
157 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1783.
158 Id. at 1783-84.
159 Id. at 1783.
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Hansmann asserts that "many of America's largest and most pros-
perous law firms have long followed a practice of sharing the partner-
ship's earnings equally among all partners of a given age, regardless of
individual productivity." 160 He says that this is an "astonishing fact" be-
cause law firms generally monitor individual productivity.1 61 The abil-
ity to monitor individual activity and to pay accordingly is not as
important to the law firm as assuring equal pay and equal type of work
among the partners. 162 Thus, according to Hansmann, the existing part-
ners resist admitting to partnership any lawyer who in not of equal com-
petence and productivity as the existing partners.' 63 Additionally, the
existing partners resist letting some partners work fewer hours than aver-
age in exchange for a smaller share of the firm's net profits.164
Owners adopt equal sharing schemes to reduce the costs of collec-
tive decision making. Hansmann concedes, however, that some firms
adjust the partnership share by monitoring productivity. 165 Today, most
major law firms adjust partnership salaries by productivity. The firms
define productivity in terms of how many hours the partners bill or how
many new clients they bring in. There can be, however, considerable
controversy about how to structure these formulas within the firm.166
When determining each employee's productivity is relatively easy,
employee ownership can exist among unequals. Hansmann concedes
this point when he asserts that "[iln general, worker ownership seems to
thrive only where, if equal sharing is not practicable, individual worker
productivities are sufficiently easy to measure so that some relatively
objective, and hence uncontroversial, method of pay that is based on that
measure can be employed."' 167
Baseball players vary in skill and do not deserve equal pay. Fortu-
nately, baseball players produce objective statistics that professional re-
porters already precisely measure. Under the combined wage scale and
160 Id. at 1785. Professor Hyde disagrees with professor Hansmann. Hyde, supra note
57, at 161. Hyde asserts that successful employee ownership exists in a plethora of diverse
situations. Successful employee ownership exists among both educated and less educated em-
ployees, who perform both simple and complex tasks, in both small and large companies.
Hyde states that successful employee ownership can be found in professional partnerships, taxi
cab collectives, construction companies, artisan manufacturers, supermarkets, and the large
industrial enterprises in Spain. Id.
161 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1785.
162 Id. at 1787.
163 Id.
164 Id. Hansmann admits, however, that this might be changing with the more recent un-
derstanding of career parents who want to work part time to take care of their children. Id.
165 Id. at 1786.
166 For example, if partner A introduces a new client to the firm, but the client agrees to
give the firm her work upon the condition the partner B does all the work - how should the
firm compensate partner A and partner B?
167 Hansmann, supra note 25, at 1786.
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ESOP plan proposed, all baseball players would receive the same base
percentage of their contracts as shares in an ESOP. All Players would
then receive additional shares of stock based on their season's objective
performance.
Hansmann also states that employee ownership is less successful
when one employee supervises another employee. 168 The employees'
foreperson is generally one of the few people with specialized skills and
is assigned the task of supervising employees. 169 In most successful co-
operatives, however, the manager does not participate in the collective
ownership.170
This would not present a problem under the baseball wage scale
theory, because the managers would not participate in the ESOP. The
Players would have significant input in hiring the manager, but the man-
ager would not be considered a player-employee or an owner of the
team.
2. Combining Employee Ownership and Greater Union
Involvement Maximizes Benefits and Minimizes Costs
a. Benefits
Partial employee ownership within the context of professional base-
ball does not violate the two basic tenets of unionism.171 First, all play-
ers would have a standardized portion of the contract paid in stock. The
primary variables would be how much their team made and their bonus,
which would depend upon specific statistics. Second, by allowing most
of the shares of stock to be allocated on an objective basis, the risk of
cooption is substantially reduced.
(i) Monitoring
Affording the Players part ownership would eradicate the "lazy ball
player." The ability to sit on the bench or have a lackluster performance
and receive an enormous salary would be greatly reduced. A millionaire
at the peak of his professional career might not pay attention to a man-
ager whom he does not respect. When the Players become part Owners,
this changes for two reasons. First, the Players would have some input in
choosing the manager and they will thus more likely respect the man-
ager. Second, the Players will become profit motivated. The more
games the team wins, the more money each Player makes.
168 Id.
169 Edward S. Greenberg, Producer Cooperatives and Democratic Theory: The Case of
the Plywood Cooperatives, in WORKER COOERATIVES IN AMRImcA 206 (R. Jackal & H. Levin
eds. 1984).
170 Id.
171 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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In addition, fan attendance determines a large portion of teams' rev-
enue. If the Players are exerting greater effort, their fan attendance will
increase, which will result in even more money for everyone.
(ii) Employee Lock-In
It is an unsupported assumption that Players enjoy being traded on a
regular basis. It is equally plausible that players would prefer not to
move around. As with most employees, baseball players have similar
ties with the community - their spouses might have jobs, their kids
could be in schools, and they might have various friends and relatives in
the local community.
Secondly, society should encourage Players to become role models.
Many children want to emulate professional athletes. Players are ex-
tremely well compensated: as a society we should encourage Players to
remain in one town, develop a tie with the community, and "give some-
thing back" to the community which is partly responsible for their high
compensation.
(iii) Strategic Behavior and Communication
As partial owners, the Players would have greater access to the
team's financial records and other pertinent information. Under the pres-
ent situation, "[t]he Players feel they're not receiving a fair share of the
gate, whereas the Owners claim that uncontrolled salaries could bankrupt
the company." 172 This results in strategic bargaining and inefficient
behavior.
The Players, having played baseball their entire lives, have a spe-
cialized understanding of what could potentially benefit or harm the
team. Further, the antagonistic model would be dissipated; it would no
longer be a zero-sum game. According to one sports writer, "[w]e have a
baseball strike for only one reason: with so much money on the table,
both parties think the other is getting too much of it."173 If this antagonis-
tic model were extinguished, Players would only pursue the preferences
172 Renton, supra note 146, at D2. For example, Kevin Gross made $2.7 million in 1994
with Los Angeles when he finished with a winning record (9-7) for first time in 9 years and
only his second time in his 11 year career. The Texas Rangers just recently signed him to a 2
year contract worth $6 million per year, Lee Smith, who is almost 40 years old, made $1.5
million with Baltimore in 1993, with a fast ball that had faded from well over 90 m.p.h. to just
over 80 m.p.h., and after starting the 1994 season with a record of 0-4 with a 5.59 E.R.A.
Tracey Ringolsby, Owners' Money Woes Have Hollow Ring, ROCKY MTN. Nws, Dec. 18,
1994, at Sports 1.
173 Dickson, supra note 148, at 5C.
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that are really important to them and would concede on less important
matters.174
(iv) Enjoy Governance
Similar to employee lock-in,175 there is no reason to expect that
Players are any different from any other type of employee, and thus
would receive the same psychological satisfaction from having a role in
the decision making process.
b. Costs Negated
The nature of baseball reduces most of the potential problems asso-
ciated with employee ownership. First, less capital is needed. After the
team rents the ball park, the Players are their own capital. Second, base-
ball is a proven capital success. Over the past two decades the Players
and Owners have made enough money to satisfy their fixed costs. Under
this proposed theory, with shared information and player involvement in
team decisions, the mistrust and greed should dissipate, and it is fairly
certain that Players and Owners will be extremely well compensated.
Third, the Players would concede that they lack certain managerial skills.
Under the proposed theory the Players would only be partial Owners.
Players would have to recognize that they are not prepared to influence
all business decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professional baseball players are some of the most highly compen-
sated individuals in the world; yet, the Players felt they had to strike to
ensure their rights. The effects of the cancellation of the 1994 World
Series are still being felt in unusually low attendance at games and poor
television ratings. Furthermore, if the situation does not change, baseball
is headed for another strike. Initially, employee ownership might appear
to be a sacrifice. Both sides may be reluctant to initiate what might ap-
pear to be a risky venture. However, the intrinsic characteristics of base-
ball maximizes the benefits and minimizes the risks generally associated
with employee ownership.
According to Professor Hyde, employee ownership is most appeal-
ing where, in addition to the ordinary conflicts of interest between own-
ers and employees, the history of ownership opportunism has led to lack
174 The Owners have some legitimate claims. For example, the players on a particular
team might collectively decide that they would rather fly on commercial airlines rather than
their own personal plane, which over a season could save a team hundreds of thousands of
dollars. The players might decide that they would receive some of that expense as their por-
tion of the of the team's net profits.
175 See infra Part IV.A.2.
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of trust between owners and employees.1 76 Professional baseball has
been filled with low trust and high opportunism. Fortunately, there is a
solution: stronger unions and partial employee ownership.
Russell M. Yankwitt
176 Hyde, supra note 57, at 174.
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